57. Vested rights.
a. "To say, then, as the land use ordinance says, that it is
desirable in the public interest that such gambling establishments as may be licensed
should (together with other businesses) be segregated within a specified commercial
zone, does not mean that all property within that zone may, in the public interest,
be devoted to gambling. To say that all property within that zone is generally
adaptable to gambling use gives it no vested right to such use."
Primm v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 7, 18, 252 P.2d
835 (1953). No. 3.
b. "In the facts of this case, we believe the district
court correctly held that appellants had no vested right to application of sperseded
zoning regulations [not yet formally abrogated], and that the ordinances in effect
when the court ruled [pending at time of denial of permit by TRPA] were controlling."
Kings Castle v. Washoe Co. Bd. Comm'rs, 88 Nev.
557, 559, 502 P.2d 103 (1972). No. 14.
c. "Although certain inroads are appearing in the general rule
that vested rights against changes in the zoning laws exist only after the issuance
of a building permit and the commencement of construction, such inroads do not
confer vested rights unless zoning or use approvals are not subject to further
governmental discretionary actions affecting project commencement."
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. CMC of Nevada, 99 Nev. 739,
747, 670 P.2d 102 (1983). No. 29.
d. Despite negligence in enforcing and interpreting zoning
and building codes: "It would be an abuse of discretion in the instant case and
contrary to principles of equitable estoppel to retroactively enforce reinterpreted
zoning laws or to assert previously waived building code infractions after funds
had been loaned and construction nearly completed. We hold that when a building
permit has been issued, vested rights against changes in zoning laws exist after
the permittee has incurred considerable expense in reliance thereupon."
City of Reno v. Nevada First Thrift, 100 Nev.
483, 487, 686 P.2d 231 (1984). No. 31.
e. "However, we are not convinced that just because the legislature
let individual counties determine their own procedure to alter zoning // in derogation
of a special use permit, counties are free to make changes without personally
notifying the citizens who will be directly affected. Due process concerns require
that a property owner must be notified when its rights are changed, even if those
rights are not vested.
Bing Construction v. Douglas County, 107 Nev. 262,
265-266, 810 P.2d 768 (1991). No. 39.
f. "In order for rights in a proposed development project to
vest, zoning or use approvals must not be subject to further governmental discretionary
action affecting project commencement, and the developer must prove considerable
reliance on the approvals granted. See City of Reno v. Nevada First Thrift,
100 Nev. 483, 487, 686 P.2d 231, 233 (1984); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. CMC of
Nevada, 99 Nev. 739, 747, 670 P.2d 102, 107 (1983)."
American West Dev. v. City of Henderson, 111
Nev. 804, 807, 898 P.2d 110 (1995). No. 46.