73. Severance
    1. "(T)he damage to the residue of a tract of land from which a portion is taken for public use is always an element of estimate in arriving at the compensation for the land taken....".  The Virginia and Truckee Railroad Company v. John Henry, 8 Nev. 165, 171 (1873) (#6)
    2. "'(T)he appraisers are not to go into conjectural and speculative estimations of consequential damages, but confine themselves to estimating the value of the land taken to the owner. This is most readily and fairly ascertained by determining the value of the whole land without the railway and of the portion remaining after the railway is built. The difference is the true compensation to which the party is entitled.'" Id. at 175 (#6)
    3. "In the absence of any evidence of damage to the residue an award for severance damage would be improper."  Mack v. Dep't. of Highways, 77 Nev. 422, 424-425, 365 P.2d 1117 (1961) (#34)
    4. A dedication to the City of land for highway use may not necessarily preclude the landowner from demonstrating new and uncontemplated damages.  Rainbow Blvd. v. State ex rel. Dep't Hwys., 96 Nev. 637, 642, 615 P.2d 931 (1980) (#63)
    5. Severance damages are awarded in partial taking cases to compensate for diminution in value to remaining parcels.  M & R Investment Co. v. State Dep't Transp., 103 Nev. 449, 455, 744 P.2d 531 (1987) (#73)
    6. "Severance damages will not be awarded for injury to separate and independent parcels owned by the condemnee." Id. at 449 (#73)
    7. Joinder/Severance: "(E)ven where severance damages to a remaining parcel may not be appropriate, the possibility of joinder may still be a proper consideration in the valuation of the property taken." Id. at 451 (#73)
    8. Severance/Larger Parcel: "The concept of large parcel is instrumental in determining both the value of the property condemned and whether severance damages are to be awarded in an eminent domain action." Id. at 449 (#73)
    9. Severance/Larger Parcel: "In order to show that a parcel condemned is part of a larger parcel, it is generally held that there must be unity of title, contiguity, and unity of use of the property." Id. at 449 Physical contiguity is not necessary "so long as the evidence discloses an actual and existing unity of use and purpose and an existing, lawful and utilized access between the parcels." Id. at 450 (#73)
    10. Severance/Larger Parcel/Questions of Fact and Law: "Under the prevailing rule, identification of the larger tract is an issue of fact to be decided by the trier of fact." Id. at 450. Although "there may be instances wherein the facts are so compellingly clear that the issue becomes one of law for determination by the trial court." Id. at 450 (#73)
    11. Severance damages: "We held further that damages are to be calculated based on the difference in market value 'before and after' the impairment." Schwartz v. State, Dep't of Transp., 111 Nev. 999, 1001, 900 P.2d 939 (1995)
    12. Severance damages: "The construction of a frontage road providing an alternative means of ingress and egress is a factor mitigating damages." Id.
    13. Severance damages: "NRS 37.110(3) provides that the following must be ascertained and assessed: 'If the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages.' We have held that this provision applies to property as a result of construction of an improvement or where a property right which is directly connected to the use or ownership of the property is substantially impaired or extinguished. See State, Dep't of Transp. v. Las Vegas Build. Materials, Inc., 104 Nev. 479, 485-486, 761 P.2d 843, 847 (1988); Sloat v. Turner, 93 Nev. 263, 269, 563 P.2d 86, 89 (1977)."  Schwartz v. State, Dep't of Transp., 111 Nev. 999, 1003, 900 P.2d 939 (1995) (#81)
    14. Access/Severance damages/Frontage roads: "As previously noted, a property owner abutting a public highway has a special right of easement in a public road for access purposes, which is a property right of the class protected by NRS 37.110(3). Such a property right may not be substantially impaired without the payrnent of damages to the affected property owner. Therefore, the jury should have been allowed to consider the Landowners' evidence on 'before and after' damages attributable to the incremental cost of developing access to the frontage road, even if the State acted reasonably in the construction of the road. This is true despite the fact that the Landowners had not yet developed access to U.S 95 when the right of access was // denied, because a right of easement nevertheless existed and was part of the 'before' factor of the fair market value consideration of the property." Id. at 1003-1004
    15. Severance damages/Diversion of traffic/Good will/Zoning: "Some damages, of course, resulting from the orderly pursuits of society, are simply not compensable. See Probasco v. City of Reno, 85 Nev. 563, 566, 459 P.2d 772, 774 (1969) (there is no right to compensation for damages resulting from reasonable zoning regulations, or by reason of the diversion of traffic away from one's property); State ex rel. Herman v. Schaffer, 467 P.2d 66, 73-74 (Ariz. 1970) (no measure of compensation may be calculated based on noncompensable factors such as diversion of traffic or loss of customers, goodwill, income or profits, except to the extent that the highest and best use of the real estate in question is affected thereby). The 'before and after" damages referred to in Linnecke pertain exclusively to those arising in connection with a diminution in the value of the Landowners real estate caused by the substantial impairment of access.' Id. at 1003, n. 4.