43. Scope of review. [See also Discretion & Record]
 
    a. "Unless we can say that the ordinance, as it affects petitioner's property, discloses an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of power by the zoning authorities and has no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, it is neither the duty nor the province of this court to interfere with the discretion invested in these authorities."
State v. Coleman, 67 Nev. 636, 641, 224 P.2d 309 (1950). No. 2.
 
    b. "Concededly, the action taken by the city council in its administrative capacity...would not warrant interference by the trial court except where there was a manifest abuse of discretion. Here, however, where there was no evidence to support the council's actions, the trial court's action was proper."
Henderson v. Henderson Auto, 77 Nev. 118, 122, 359 P.2d 743 (1961). No. 5.
 
    c. "Respondents recognize the general rule that a court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of a zoning board, in this case the board of county commissioners."
McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 240, 362 P.2d 268 (1961). No. 6.
 
    d. "The trial court's function is "limited to a review of the record of information presented to the city council...."
Urban Renewal Agcy. v. Iacometti, 79 Nev. 113, 118, 379 P.2d 466 (1963). No. 7.
 
    e. "Nevada has recognized this principle for years in varying circumstances. We have not distinguished between the scope of trial court review of a formal hearing by a government body, Nevada Tax Commission v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 310 P.2d 852; its review of such body's determination made after investigation and a public hearing, McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 362 P.2d 268; and its review of a governmental body's discretionary ruling made after investigation and inquiry, but without a formal hearing or a public hearing, Douglas County Board of County Commissioners v. Pedersen, 78 Nev. 106, 369 P.2d 669. In each instance, the court's inquiry is limited to the record of information presented to the governmental body. The court's purpose is to ascertain whether, upon such information, that body acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and abused its discretion.. Thus, a trial court should sustain discretionary action of a governmental body, absent an abuse thereof, to the same extent that an appellate court upholds the discretionary action of a trial court." Id. at 118.
 
    f. "Courts are becoming increasingly aware that they are neither super boards of adjustment nor planning commissions of last resort. (citations omitted) Rather, the court acts as a judicial overseer, drawing the limits beyond which local regulation may not go, but loathing to interfere, within those limits, with the discretion of local governing bodies." (citation omitted)
Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 84 Nev. 250, 256, 439 P.2d 219 (1968). No. 10.
 
    g. "The zoning power is one of the tools of government which, in order to be effective, must not be subjected to judicial interference unless clearly necessary. For this reason, a presumption of validity attaches to a zoning ordinance which imposes the burden to prove its invalidity upon the one who challenges it." Id. at 256.
 
    h. "The review of administrative decisions by the district court and this court is limited to the record made before the administrative tribunal, and in the absence of a showing that the agency acted fraudulently or arbitrarily, the district court may not substitute its opinion for that of the city commissioners. City of Reno v. Folsom, 86 Nev. 39, 464 P.2d 454 (1970); Urban Renewal Agency v. Iacometti, 79 Nev. 113, 379 P.2d // 466 (1963); McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 362 P.2d 268 (1961); City of Henderson v. Henderson Auto Wrecking, Inc., supra; Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 310 P.2d 852 (1957).
State ex rel. Johns v. Gragson, 89 Nev. 478, 482-483, 515 P.2d 65 (1973). No. 15.
 
    i. "The record in the instant case is void of any evidence to support the ruling revoking Johns' home occupation permit. In such a case, therefore, where the decision of an administrative body is arbitrary, oppressive, or accompanied by manifest abuse, this court will not hesitate to interfere. City of Henderson v. Henderson Auto Wrecking, Inc., supra; Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 310 P.2d 852 (1957)." Id. at 483.
 
    j. "Zoning is a legislative mater and the legislature has acted. Eagle Thrifty v. Hunter Lake P.T.A., 85 Nev. 162, 451 P.2d 713 (1969).... As a general proposition, the zoning power should not be subjected to judicial interference unless clearly necessary. Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 84 Nev. 250, 439 P.2d 219 (1968)."
Board of Comm'rs v. Dayton Dev. Co., 91 Nev. 71, 75, 530 P.2d 1187 (1975). No. 18.
 
    k. Court erred by conducting a trial de novo. "Its province was confined to a review of the record of evidence presented to the Clark County Board of Commissioners and the Planning Department, with its primary focus on the variance itself."
Clark Co. Bd. Comm'rs v. Taggart Constr., 96 Nev. 732, 734, 615 P.2d 965 (1980). No. 24.
 
    l. "Like the district court, we are limited to the record made before the City Council in our review of the council's decision. State ex rel. Johns v. Gragson, 89 Nev. at 482, 515 P.2d at 68; // McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 362 P.2d 268 (1961). In the instant case the City Council gave no reasons for its decision, and there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the denial of Travelers' special use permit."
City Council, Reno v. Travelers Hotel, 100 Nev. 436, 439-440, 683 P.2d 960 (1984). No. 30.
 
    m. "While we have said that courts are not super boards of adjustment, we have nevertheless recognized that they can properly act as judicial overseers, 'drawing the limits beyond which local regulation may not go.' Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 84 Nev. 250, 256, 439 P.2d 219, 223 (1968). More importantly, we have held that 'where the decision of an administrative body is arbitrary, oppressive, or accompanied by manifest abuse, this court will not hesitate to interfere.' State ex rel. Johns v. Gragson, 89 Nev. 478, 483, 515 P.2d 65, 68 (1973)."
City of Reno v. Nevada First Thrift, 100 Nev. 483, 488, 686 P.2d 231 (1984). No. 31.
 
    n. "Finally, we note it is not the business of courts to decide zoning issues. Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 84 Nev. 250, 256, 439 P.2d 219, 223 (1968). Because of the Board's particular expertise in zoning, courts must defer to and not interfere with the Board's discretion if this discretion is not abused."
Nevada Contractors v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 310, 314, 792 P.2d 31 (1990). No. 37.
 
    o. "We have settled the deferential standard of review accorded to actions of municipalities in prior decisions of this court. Thus, in Urban Renewal Agency v. Iacometti, 79 Nev. 113, 118, 379 P.2d 466, 468 (1963), we held that 'a trial court should sustain discretionary action of a governmental body, absent an abuse thereof, to the same extent that an appellate court upholds the discretionary action of a trial court.' We also held in Clark County Liquor & Gaming v. Simon & Tucker, 106 Nev. 96, 97, 787 P.2d 782, 783 (1990), that 'the court may interfere with an agency's decision only when there is a manifest abuse of discretion.' In Simon & Tucker, we determined that in balancing private and public interests, a governmental agency must consider the public interest paramount. Id. Finally, in characterizing the type of discretionary abuse inviting judicial intervention, we observed that 'the essence of the abuse of discretion, of the arbitrariness or capriciousness of govern // mental action in denying a license application, is most often found in an apparent absence of any grounds or reasons for the decision. 'We did it just because we did it.'' City Council v. Irvine, 102 Nev. 277, 280, 721 P.2d 37 (sic), 372-73 (1986)."
Tighe v. Von Goerken, 108 Nev. 440, 442-443, 833 P.2d 1135 (1992). No. 40.
 
    p. "Like the district court, this court is limited to the record made before the City in reviewing the City's decision. See State ex. rel. Johns v. Gragson, 89 Nev. 478, 482, 515 P.2d 65, 68 (1973). The grant or denial of a request for a special use permit is a discretionary act. City Council, Reno v. Travelers Hotel, 100 Nev. 436, 439, 683 P.2d 960, 961-62 (1984). If this discretionary act is supported by substantial evidence, there is no abuse of discretion. Id. Substantial evidence is that which ''a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'' State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971))."
City of Las Vegas v. Laughlin, 111 Nev. 557, 558, 893 P.d 383 (1995). No. 44.
 
    q. "When a district court has reviewed a zoning decision without taking additional evidence and the decision is appealed to this court, the scope of review is usually limited to a determination of whether the agency or municipality which made the decision appealed from committed an abuse of discretion. See Nevada Contractors v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 310, 313-14, 792 P.2d 31, 33 (1990). Review by this court is based upon the record made before the commission or council, City Council, Reno v. Travelers Hotel, 100 Nev. 436, 439, 683 P.2d 960, 962 (1984), and the grant or denial of a special use permit will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."
City of Reno v. Harris, 111 Nev. 672, 677, 895 P.2d 663 (1995). No. 45.
 
    r. "No presumption of validity attaches to the decision of a district court that does not hear additional evidence in reviewing a zoning decision made by a municipality. (citation omitted) However, where the district court takes additional evidence, the scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the district court committed an abuse of discretion or made an error of law." Id. at 677.
 
    s. "The function of the district court is to ascertain as a matter of law whether there was substantial evidence before the Board which would sustain the Board's actions, and the function of this court at this time is the same as that of the district court. McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 242, 362 P.2d 268, 270 (1961). Like the district court, this court is limited to the record made before the Board in reviewing the Board's decision. Laughlin, 111 Nev. at 558, 893 P.2d at 384. Finally, 'no presumption of validity attaches to the decision of a district court that does not hear additional evidence in reviewing a zoning decision made by a municipality.' City of Reno v. Harris, 111 Nev. 672, 677, 895 P.2d 663, 666 (1995)."
Enterprise Citizens v. Clark Co. Comm'rs, 112 Nev. 649, 653, 918 P.2d 305(1996). No. 48.

 t.  "The grant or denial of a rezoning request is a discretionary act. See McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 362 P.2d 268 (1961) (stating that under the police power, zoning is a matter within sound legislative discretion and such legislative action must be upheld if the facts do not show that the bounds of that discretion have been exceeded.) If a discretinary act is supported by substantial evidence, there is no abuse of discretion. Enterprise Citizens v. Clark Co. Comm'rs, 112 Nev. 649, 918 P.2d 305 (1996). Further, a presumption of validity attaches to local zoning enactments and amendments. See McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 362 P.2d 268 (1961).
County of Clark v. Doumani, 114 Nev.Adv.Op. 6 (1998) (p. 6)  No. 49

    u.  "Previously, we stated that we would review a district court decision granting or denying a writ petition for an abuse of discretion only if the district court has taken additional evidence from that heard by the commission or council. See City of Reno v. Harris, 111 Nev. 672, 895 P.2d 663 (1995). Otherwise, we would focus on the commission or council's decision and examine it for an abuse of discretion. See Harris, 111 Nev. at 677, 895 P.2d at 666. We see no reason, however, to make a distinction in the standard of review based on whether the disctrict court has taken additional evidence. Since the district court has discretion to grant or deny a writ petition, all appeals from a district court grant or denial of a writ petition will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."
County of Clark v. Doumani, 114 Nev.Adv.Op. 6 (1998) (p. 6, n. 2)  No. 49