39. Rehearing.
    a. "(W)e will assume that, upon rehearing, the Council will exercise its judgment fairly and in accordance with the merits as reflected by the evidence and deliberations of record."
Nova Horizon v. City Council, Reno, 105 Nev. 92, 97, 769 P.2d 721 (1989). No. 36.
    b. "Despite our conclusion that the record does not evince a clearly arbitrary and capricious decision by the Council, it is nevertheless apparent that the Council acted without the benefit of a reasonably developed evidentiary or factual presentation. We are convinced that when private property is denied the uses for which it is zoned, any such denial must be based upon meaningful, reasonably complete factual information.
    Although we unable to conclude that the Council's decision represents a basis for judicial intervention in the form of mandamus, we do conclude that the evidentiary basis for the Council's action was inadequate. Therefore, a new public hearing will be necessary in order for the Council to fully consider factual information pertaining to the impact or effect of Von Goerken's application for
a tavern liquor license. Van Goerken is to be given lawful notice of the meeting to allow him sufficient opportunity to gather evidence in support of his application."
Tighe v. Von Goerken, 108 Nev. 440, 444, 833 P.2d 1135 (1992). No. 40.
    c. Decides that the facts are more like Travelers Hotel than Nova; the latter remanded the request for a special use permit for rehearing. In present case, "the Council was able to focus on the project itself" and "the district court had a sufficient record upon which to base its order."
City of Reno v. Lars Andersen and Assocs., 111 Nev. 522, 527, 894 P.2d 984 (1995). No. 43.
    d. "The City argues that the district court's order improperly precluded the Council from receiving further needed evidence and exercising its lawful discretion in regard to the items at issue. However, the City's arguments are undermined by its own Council's actions in this case. First, if the Council had not yet received sufficient evidence on these items, it should have // deferred voting on them on September 28, 1993. Instead, it voted to deny them. Second, the City argues that the district court's order to grant the permit for the project requires that the Council be allowed to reconsider the other items. Again, however, on September 28, 1993, after deferring a decision on the permit for the project, the Council did not perceive any need to delay consideration of those items and went ahead and voted to deny the other permits and the variances. In light of the Council's earlier actions, it is inconsistent and unconvincing for the City to argue that the district court's order changed everything and that more evidence and deliberation are necessary." Id. at 528-529, n.3.