a. "(W)e will assume that, upon rehearing, the Council will
exercise its judgment fairly and in accordance with the merits as reflected by
the evidence and deliberations of record."
Nova Horizon v. City Council, Reno, 105 Nev. 92,
97, 769 P.2d 721 (1989). No. 36.
b. "Despite our conclusion that the record does not evince
a clearly arbitrary and capricious decision by the Council, it is nevertheless
apparent that the Council acted without the benefit of a reasonably developed
evidentiary or factual presentation. We are convinced that when private property
is denied the uses for which it is zoned, any such denial must be based upon meaningful,
reasonably complete factual information.
Although we unable to conclude that the Council's decision
represents a basis for judicial intervention in the form of mandamus, we do conclude
that the evidentiary basis for the Council's action was inadequate. Therefore,
a new public hearing will be necessary in order for the Council to fully consider
factual information pertaining to the impact or effect of Von Goerken's application
a tavern liquor license. Van Goerken is to be given lawful notice of the meeting
to allow him sufficient opportunity to gather evidence in support of his application."
Tighe v. Von Goerken, 108 Nev. 440, 444, 833 P.2d
1135 (1992). No. 40.
c. Decides that the facts are more like Travelers Hotel
than Nova; the latter remanded the request for a special use permit for
rehearing. In present case, "the Council was able to focus on the project itself"
and "the district court had a sufficient record upon which to base its order."
City of Reno v. Lars Andersen and Assocs., 111 Nev.
522, 527, 894 P.2d 984 (1995). No. 43.
d. "The City argues that the district court's order improperly
precluded the Council from receiving further needed evidence and exercising its
lawful discretion in regard to the items at issue. However, the City's arguments
are undermined by its own Council's actions in this case. First, if the Council
had not yet received sufficient evidence on these items, it should have // deferred
voting on them on September 28, 1993. Instead, it voted to deny them. Second,
the City argues that the district court's order to grant the permit for the project
requires that the Council be allowed to reconsider the other items. Again, however,
on September 28, 1993, after deferring a decision on the permit for the project,
the Council did not perceive any need to delay consideration of those items and
went ahead and voted to deny the other permits and the variances. In light of
the Council's earlier actions, it is inconsistent and unconvincing for the City
to argue that the district court's order changed everything and that more evidence
and deliberation are necessary." Id. at 528-529, n.3.