48. Substantial evidence.
 
    a. "Such showing of an abuse of the discretion vested in the council was established before the trial court by respondent's showing of a lack of substantial evidence before the council...."
Henderson v. Henderson Auto, 77 Nev. 118, 122, 359 P.2d 743 (1961). No. 5.
 
    b. "The lower court had before it the same evidence as // the board. Its function was not to conduct a trial de novo, but to ascertain as a matter of law if there was any substantial evidence before the board which would sustain the board's action. The function of this court at this time is the same as that of the lower court."
McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 240-241, 362 P.2d 268 (1961). No. 6.
 
    c. "Because the board's action is clothed with the presumption of validity, and is supported by substantial evidence, in the absence of a showing of an abuse of its discretion, the lower court was without power to nullify the same." Id. at 242.
 
    d. "This court has held that the 'substantial evidence' requirement supporting such a [special use permit] decision is not met by statements of counsel for interested parties, Henderson v. Henderson Auto, 77 Nev. 118, 359 P.2d 743 (1961), or opinions of council members, unsupported by proof. State ex rel. Johns v. Gragson, 89 Nev. 478, 515 P.2d 65 (1973).
City Council, Reno v. Travelers Hotel, 100 Nev. 436, 439, 683 P.2d 960 (1984). No. 30.
 
    e. "Like the district court, we are limited to the record made before the City Council in our review of the council's decision. State ex rel. Johns v. Gragson, 89 Nev. at 482, 515 P.2d at 68; // McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 362 P.2d 268 (1961). In the instant case the City Council gave no reasons for its decision, and there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the denial of Travelers' special use permit." Id. at 439-440.
 
    f. "The City Council's argument that the lay witness' remarks concerning the location of the hotel-casino near a high school constituted a basis for its decision is considerably weakened by the council's approval, since the decision below, of two hotel-casino operations that are the same distance from the school." Id. at 439, n. 4.
 
    g. "When reviewing an administrative board's actions, this court, like the district court, is limited to the record below and to whether the board acted arbitrarily or capriciously. (citation omitted) The question thus becomes whether the board's decision was based on substantial evidence; if based on substantial evidence neither this court, nor // the district court, may substitute its judgment for the administrator's determination."
State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 607-608, 729 P.2d 497 (1986) No. 33.
 
    h. "Substantial evidence has been defined as that which 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971)." Id. at 608.
 
    i. Approves McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 240-242, 362 P.2d 268, 269-70 (1961), re substantial evidence.
Nova Horizon v. City Council, Reno, 105 Nev. 92, 769 P.2d 721 (1989). No. 36.
 
    j. "The Kohler court [Town of Vienna Council v. Kohler, 244 S.E.2d 542, 548 (1978)] concluded that 'a denial of a rezoning request will not be sustained if under all the facts of the particular case, the denial is unreasonable, or is discriminatory, or is without substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.'" Id. at 95.
 
    k. "It is clear on the record that no evidentiary basis exists for the Council's denial of appellants' zone change request. It is equally clear that no deference, let alone a presumptive applicability, was accorded Reno's master plan by the Council. In one instance, an expression of deference to a campaign promise was the stated basis for what was tantamount to a disregard for the master plan. The other expression offered as a specific basis for rejecting appellants' application was a pledge, presumably to constituents, to seek diversification in favor of higher employee wages. The latter point was equally untenable as a basis for zoning denial." Id. at 97.
 
    l. "We are simply unable to discern from the record that the Council adequately focused its attention on the merits of the project and its total impact on the community. Considerations of public health, safety and welfare demand both such a focused attention and the exercise of a fair and enlightened discretion by the Council based upon substantial evidence." Id. at 98.
 
    m. "The grant or denial of a special use permit is a discretionary act. City Council, Reno v. Travelers Hotel, 100 Nev. 436, 439, 683 P.2d 960, 961-962 (1984), quoting Henderson v. Henderson Auto, 77 Nev. 118, 122, 359 P.2d 743, 745 (1961). If this discretionary act is supported by substantial evidence, there is no abuse of that discretion. City Council, Reno, 100 Nev. at 439, 683 P.2d at 961-962. Without an abuse of discretion, the grant or denial of a special use permit shall not be disturbed. Id. at 440, 683 P.2d at 962."
Nevada Contractors v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 310, 313, 792 P.2d 31 (1990). No. 37.
 
    n. Distinguishes City Council, Reno v. Travelers Hotel, on ground that the lay evidence - that the traffic of a gaming establishment would be dangerous to children in the area - was substantial evidence in support of denial of a county liquor and gaming license.
Clark Co. Liquor & Gaming v. Simon & Tucker, 106 Nev. 96, 787 P.2d 782 (1990). No. 38.
 
    o. "The approval or denial of a special use permit is a discretionary act. Nevada Contractors v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 310, 312, 792 P.2d 31, 33 (1990). If the act is supported by substantial evidence, the courts will not disturb it. Id."
City of Reno v. Lars Andersen and Assocs., 111 Nev. 522, 894 P.2d 984 (1995). No. 43.
 
    p. "Like the district court, this court is limited to the record made before the City in reviewing the City's decision. See State ex. rel. Johns v. Gragson, 89 Nev. 478, 482, 515 P.2d 65, 68 (1973). The grant or denial of a request for a special use permit is a discretionary act. City Council, Reno v. Travelers Hotel, 100 Nev. 436, 439, 683 P.2d 960, 961-62 (1984). If this discretionary act is supported by substantial evidence, there is no abuse of discretion. Id. Substantial evidence is that which ''a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'' State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971))."
City of Las Vegas v. Laughlin, 111 Nev. 557, 558, 893 P.d 383 (1995). No. 44.
 
    q. "We conclude that the concerns expressed by the public, specifically those over increased traffic where children walk to school // and preserving the residential nature of the neighborhood, establish a valid basis for the denial of Laughlin's request for a special use permit. See Tighe, 108 Nev. at 443, 833 P.2d at 1137; Clark Co. Liquor & Gaming, 106 Nev. at 98, 787 P.2d at 783. Accordingly, we conclude that the City's decision was based on substantial evidence and the City did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying Laughlin's request for a special use permit."
Id. at 559-560.
 
    r. "The decision as to specific uses within the transition zone was for the Reno Council to make should only be disturbed if not supported by substantial evidence."
City of Reno v. Harris, 111 Nev. 672, 679, 895 P.2d 663 (1995). No. 45.
 
    s. "Because Henderson's denial of AWD's zoning application was based upon an error of law, the fact that the denial may have otherwise been supported by substantial evidence and unabused discretion, as the district court concluded, is not relevant."
American West Dev. v. City of Henderson, 111 Nev. 804, 809, 898 P.2d 110 (1995). No. 46.
 
    t. "The grant or denial of a variance, like a grant or denial of a request for a special use permit, is a discretionary act. See City of Las Vegas v. Laughlin, 111 Nev. 557, 558, 893 P.2d 383, 384 (1995). 'If this discretionary act is supported by substantial evidence, there is no abuse of discretion.' Id. Substantial evidence is evidence which 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986)."
Enterprise Citizens v. Clark Co. Comm'rs, 112 Nev. 649, 653, 918 P.2d 305 (1996). No. 48.
 
    u. "The function of the district court is to ascertain as a matter of law whether there was substantial evidence before the Board which would sustain the Board's actions, and the function of this court at this time is the same as that of the district court. McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 242, 362 P.2d 268, 270 (1961). Like the district court, this court is limited to the record made before the Board in reviewing the Board's decision. Laughlin, 111 Nev. at 558, 893 P.2d at 384. Finally, 'no presumption of validity attaches to the decision of a district court that does not hear additional evidence in reviewing a zoning decision made by a municipality.' City of Reno v. Harris, 111 Nev. 672, 677, 895 P.2d 663, 666 (1995)." Id. at 653.
 
    v. "In Tighe v. Von Goerken, 108 Nev. 440, 833 P.2d 1135 (1992), we noted that "'the essence of the abuse of discretion, of the arbitrariness or capriciousness of government action...is most often found in an apparent absence of any grounds or reasons for the decision,'" or in other words, "'[w]e did it just because we did it.'" Id. at 442-43, 833 P.2d at 1136 (quoting City Council v. Irvine, 102 Nev. 277, 280, 721 P.2d 371, 372-73 (1996)). Additionally, we have previously accepted the definitions of arbitrary and capricious, respectively, as 'baseless' or 'despotic' and "'a sudden turn of mind without apparent motive; a freak, whim, mere fancy.'" City Council v. Irvine, 102 Nev. 277, 278-79, 721 P.2d 371, 372 (1986) (quoting The Oxford Universal Dictionary).
City of Reno v. Estate of Wells, 110 Nev. 1218, 1222, 885 P.2d 545 (1994). No. 41.
 
    w. "'Substantial evidence' is that which 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' See, e.g., Ruggles v. Public Service Comm'n, 109 Nev. 36, 40, 846 P.2d 299, 302 (1993). Substantial evidence need not be voluminous; and in this case, it may be inferentially shown by the lack of evidence that abandonment of the right-of-way would impose a material injury upon the public." Id. at 1222.
 
    x. "In sum, reasonable minds may properly conclude that the abandonment does not result in a material public injury and therefore, the // Council's decision is supported by substantial evidence."
Id. at 1222-1223.