7. Constitution. [See also Due process and Equal protection]
a. "The various grounds of the several courts supporting
such ordinances are discussed at length, and we refer to the opinion in that
case [Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 120, 71
L.Ed. 303] and the annotation following as forever settling this exercise of
the police power, unless it clearly appears that the ordinance is arbitrary
and unreasonable and has no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare."
State v. Coleman, 67 Nev. 636, 641, 224 P.2d 309 (1950). No. 2.
b. "The law requires that zoning ordinances observe state
and federal constitutional provisions and requirements including that of due
process. State v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90 P.2d 217 (1939). The governing
body of a city has the power to change // land use classifications, but no such
regulation may become effective until after notice and public hearing at which
interested parties and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard.
Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, 89 Nev. 533, 538-539, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973). No. 16.
c. "When a statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action becomes quasi judicial in character, and the statutory notice and hearing then becomes (sic) necessary in order to satisfy the requirments of due process and may not be dispensed with." Id. at 539.
d. "An ordinance is unconstitutionally vague if it either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of ordinary
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Such an ordinance
is 'void for vagueness' and inconsistent with due process of law. Additionally,
an ordinance may be void for vagueness if its imprecision is likely to encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist
Movement, ..... U.S. ....., ....., 112 S.Ct. 2395, 2403 (1992) (stating
that the First Amendment prohibits the vesting of unbridled discretion in government
officials); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972);
Eaves v. Board of Clark County Comm'rs, 96 Nev. 921, 924, 620 P.2d 1248,
City of Las Vegas v. 1017 S. Main Corp., 110 Nev. 1227, 1231, 885 P.2d 552 (1994). No. 42.
e. "The word 'altered' conveys a clear meaning when standing on its own, and when coupled with other words of limitation, as it is here, its meaning is not rationally susceptible to an attack on grounds of vagueness." Id. at 1234.
f. "(A) facially valid ordinance may be the vehicle for
unequal protection of the law when applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). More particularly,
we have noted that '[e]qual protection of the law has long been recognized to
mean that no class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the law
which is enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances.' Allen v.
State, 100 Nev. 130, 135, 676 P.2d 792, 795 (1984) (emphasis added)." Id.