2. Access

     1. Restriction of access is not compensable where it is no more "than that which usually results from the mere ordinary use of a street." V. & T.R.R. Co. v. Lynch, 13 Nev. 92, 97 (1878) (#9)

    2. The landowner is entitled to compensation where an abutting public highway is converted to a freeway restricting access, requiring the landowner to travel farther to reach it, taking away direct access previously had from the old road. State ex rel. Dep't Hwys v. Linnecke, 86 Nev. 257, 468 P.2d 8 (1970) (#48)

    3. "An abutting owner of a public highway has a special right of easement in a public road for access purposes. This is a property right of easement which cannot be damaged or taken from the owner without due compensation. (cite) But an owner is not entitled to access to his land at all points in the boundary to it and the highway, although entire access to his property cannot be cut off. If he has free and convenient access to his property and his means of egress and ingress are not substantially interfered with, he has no cause for complaint." Id. at 260 (#48)

    4. A frontage road may mitigate damages. Id. (#48)

    5. "A determination of 'substantial impairment of access' must be reached as a matter of law." Lied v. County of Clark, 94 Nev. 275, 278, 579 P.2d 171 (1978) (#58)

    6. "'(A)n owner is not entitled to access to his land at all points in the boundary to it and the highway, although entire access to his property cannot be cut off. If he has free and convenient access to his property and his means of egress and ingress are not substantially interfered with, hehas no cause for complaint.'" Id. at 278, quoting Linnecke, #43 (#58)

    7. The district court must determine whether substantial impairment of access has been established as a matter of law in inverse condemnation actions. Culley v. County of Elko, 101 Nev. 838, 840-841, 711 P.2d 864 (1985) (#71)

    8. The court may not base its determination of impairment of access on the district court's view of a new access road. "The district court determination whether substantial impairment of access has been established as a matter of law must be based upon the evidence presented at trial." Id. at 841 (#71)

    9. We held in State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Linnecke, 86 Nev. 257, 468 P.2d 8 (1970):
        "An abutting owner of a public highway has a special right of easement in a public road for access purposes. This is a property right of easement which cannot be damaged or taken from the owner without due compensation. People v. Murray, 342 P.2d 485, 488 (Cal. App. 1959). . . . If he has free and convenient access to his property and his means of egress and ingress are not substantially interfered wtth, he has no cause for complaint. Breidert v. So. Pac. Co., 394 P.2d 719, 722 (Cal. 1964); City of Phoenix v. Wade, 428 P.2d 450, 454 (Ariz. App. 1967). The determination of whether such substantial impairment has been established must be reached as a matter of law. The extent of such impairment must be fixed as a matter of fact." Schwartz v. State, Dep't of Transp., 111 Nev. 998, 1001, 900 P.2d 939 (1995) (#81)

    10. Access/Severance damages/Frontage roads: "As previously noted, a property owner abutting a public highway has a special right of easement in a public road for access purposes, which is a property right of the class protected by NRS 37.110(3). Such a property right may not be substantially impaired without the payrnent of damages to the affected property owner. Therefore, the jury should have been allowed to consider the Landowners' evidence on 'before and after' damages attributable to the incremental cost of developing access to the frontage road, even if the State acted reasonably in the construction of the road. This is true despite the fact that the Landowners had not yet developed access to U.S 95 when the right of access was // denied, because a right of easement nevertheless existed and was part of the 'before' factor of the fair market value consideration of the property." Id. at 1003-1004.